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Foreword 
This document summarizes policy tools in U.S. agriculture. In the past 50 years, since the 
Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1933, a wide array of farm programs has evolved. It is important 
for the public to recognize that, due to numerous factors, wide variations in agricultural production 
create income instability for farmers and ranchers as well as uncertainty in supplies and prices for 
processors and consumers. Consequently, farm policy is an important function for the U.S. govern-
ment. Individually, farmers and ranchers are not able to control the numerous variables that affect 
agriculture. The form and degree of government involvement in policy is the subject of considera-
ble debate. 
In this document, government policy tools impacting agriculture are individually reviewed, 
with regard to implementation, procedures, and the impacts on prices and supplies. The purpose is 
not to advocate particular farm programs or policies, but rather to summarize the array of tech-
niques and methods which have been utilized or considered for improving economic equity and sta-
bility in agriculture. This publication should be a useful guide and reference for those individuals 
or organizations involved in agricultural and food policy development, for those considering the 
broader domestic and international dimensions for U.S. agriculture, or for those who are interested 
in the alternatives that could be used singularly or combined. 
Keywords: Domestic Farm Policy, Commodity Programs, International Trade Policy, Market 
Development Programs 
Introduction 
Agricultural policy is a broad term used to encompass government · programs that directly 
affect the prices and incomes received by farmers. In developing agricultural policy, producers and 
agribusiness leaders, their organizations, and government policy makers must sort through a myriad 
of potential policy tools. , 
Each policy tool or government program is intended to deal with a specific farm problem in 
a specific way. For example, target prices raise farm income through direct payments from the 
government while support prices raise income by setting a floor on market prices. Some policy 
tools are more effective than others in accomplishing the objectives for which they are intended. 
For example, quotas that dictate the volume a producer can market are more efficient than acreage 
reduction programs in controlling production. Often policy tools have side effects that need to be 
considered before selections are made. For example, when price supports are set above world mar-
ket prices, exports fall . 
This publication provides descriptions of individual policy tools that most directly affect agri-
culture. The report is designed to be a comprehensive list of those policy tools that are used cur-
rently, have been used in the past, are used in other countries, or have been proposed for use in the 
United States. These tools are divided into four general categories: 
• Domestic farm programs .. designed to raise or stabilize farm prices and incomes. 
• International trade policies .. designed to create a more favorable trading environment 
for farm products. 
• Marketing programs .. designed to improve farmers' position in domestic and foreign 
markets. 
• General economic policy tools, that have had a significant impact on the prices received 
and paid by farmers. 
A single-page summary describes each policy tool with respect to the following: 
• The policy area in which the tool falls . 
• What the policy tool is. 
• The primary objective of its use. 
• When it has been used. 
• Experience with its use. 
• Consequences of its use. 
The following publications offer comprehensive discussions of the policies described here. 
Armbruster, W. J., D. R. Henderson and R. D. Knutson. Federal Marketing Programs in Agricul-
ture: Issues and Options. Danville: The Interstate Printers & Publishers, Inc. 1983. 
Christiansen, M. K., editor. Speaking of Trade: Its Effect on Agriculture. Agricultural Extension 
Service, University of Minnesota, Special Report No. 72. 1978. 
Gardner, B. L. The Governing of Agriculture. Lawrence: The Regents Press of Kansas. 1981. 
HaIcrow, H. G. Food Policy for America. New York: McGraw-Hill Book Co. 1977. 
Knutson, R. D., J. B. Penn and W. T. Boehm. Agricultural and Food Policy. Englewood Cliffs: 
Prentice-Hall, Inc. 1983. 
Paarlberg, D. Farm and Food Policy: Issues of the 1980 's. Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press. 
1980. 
Tweeten, L. Foundations of Farm Policy. Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press. 1979. 
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DOMESTIC FARM PROGRAMS 
Policy Tool: 
Policy Area: 
What It Is: 
Objective: 
When Used: 
Experience: 
Consequences: 
2 
Marketing Quotas (and Certificates) 
Domestic Farm Policy, Supply Control 
A marketing quota is a mandatory mechanism which determines the quantity of a 
commodity that can be marketed. The national quota, set by the Secretary of 
Agriculture, is based on expected domestic and export demands. It is usually 
below normal production levels but high enough to satisfy the Secretary's esti-
mate of expected market needs. Each producer is given a portion of the national 
quota based on his past production. Marketing quotas are the most effective 
means of controlling production. 
To restrict production by controlling the quantity farmers are allowed to market. 
Since marketing quotas are mandatory for all producers growing the quota crop, 
a two-thirds majority of farmers voting in a referendum must approve the quota. 
Once approved, the quota is effective for only one crop year. To be continued 
for a second year, it must be approved, in a second referendum. Farmers histor-
ically have approved a quota only when a crisis existed. Quotas are generally 
used in conjunction with relatively high price supports to encourage producer 
acceptance. Marketing quotas have been used regularly for peanuts and tobacco. 
Marketing quotas have effectively reduced production and stock levels but only 
when the national quota was set at levels consistent with demand at politically 
acceptable prices. 
• Once a quota is in place, there is pressure to increase the national quota, thus 
conteracting its purpose. 
• Like other supply control programs, marketing quotas usually reduce the vol-
ume of exports for the quota crop. 
• Marketing quotas are more efficient in reducing supply and raising price than 
acreage reduction programs because there is almost zero slippage. (Slippage is 
that portion of reduced acreage which does not result in correspondingly lower 
production; e.g., due to removing the poorest land.) 
• Marketing quotas are associated with low treasury costs unless the quota is so 
high that CCC stocks accumulate. 
• Because of the annual referendum requirement, marketing quotas create 
uncertainty for producers. This could be changed by legislative action making 
quotas effective for 4 years. 
• Marketing quotas tied to a land base tend to be capitalized into the land and 
result in increased land prices. 
• Single crop marketing quotas for major crops (e.g., wheat) adversely affect 
prices of crops planted on the idled acres (e.g., corn and sorghum). 
• Increased prices for commodities increase cost of production for livestock pro-
ducers and food prices over time. 
Policy Tool: 
Policy Area: 
What It Is: 
Objective: 
When Used: 
Experience: 
Consequences: 
Acreage Reduction (Set-Aside and Diversion) 
Domestic Farm Policy, Supply Control 
Acreage reduction consists of an acreage set-aside and/or acreage diversion that is 
generally voluntary. Acreage set-aside programs require that participating farm-
ers idle a percentage of their crop base acres to be eligible for other program 
benefits, while acreage diversion programs pay producers a given amount per 
acre to idle a percentage of their base acres. A farmer's base acres are deter-
mined by the production history of the crop. 
To reduce the quantity produced and thus the supply of a given commodity. 
Acreage set-asides and diversions were used extensively during the 1960s and 
intermittently since 1977. These programs are generally used when prices are 
depressed due to a build-up of stocks. 
Acreage reduction programs have been only modestly effective in reducing sup-
ply over the long run. These programs have usually been used when high loan 
rates, or target prices, or even temporarily high market prices encourage produc-
ers to increase production. Except for cotton and rice, acreage reduction pro-
grams have usually had relatively low producer participation. To encourage par-
ticipation, diversion payments to supplement other farm program benefits may 
be added. 
• To the extent that they reduce production, acreage reduction programs reduce 
supply, stocks, and raise prices domestically. 
• Effective acreage reduction programs reduce the volume of supply available for 
export. 
• Slippage, reduces the effectiveness of the program. 
• Diversion programs can result in large treasury outlays. 
• Payment limitations and offsetting compliance discourage participation by 
large-scale operators who farm large acreages for several landlords. 
• Failure to require cross compliance encourages producers to participate for one 
crop but not for others--reducing the effectiveness of the overall program. 
• Benefits from acreage reduction programs get bid into the price of land. 
• Acreage reduction programs tend to restrict ability of farmers to shift acreage 
in response to changes in relative crop prices. 
• Increased prices for commodities increase cost of production for livestock pro-
ducers and food prices over time. 
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Policy Tool: 
Policy Area: 
What It Is: 
Objective: 
When Used: 
Experience: 
Consequences: 
4 
Long-Term Land Retirement 
Domestic Farm Policy, Supply Control 
Long-term land retirement is a multiple year voluntary program that removes 
cropland from the production of farm commodities. 
To remove from production cropland that is devoted to crops in surplus or is 
subject to erosion. 
The program was first authorized in the Agricultural Act of 1956 as the Soil 
Bank program. In 1965 Congress re-established a land retirement program and 
called it the Cropland Adjustment Program. Funding was authorized for contin-
uation of a long-term land retirement program in 1970. Land retirement is 
acceptable to consumers and producers only when surplus stocks and low prices 
are a chronic problem. If needed, the land can readily be put back into produc-
tion, as it was in the early 1970s. 
Land retirement programs removed large quantities of cropland from production 
in the Great Plains. Cropland under long-term agreement was put into a con-
serving use (usually grassland) and was considered a national food reserve. Only 
the least productive lands were enrolled in the program. Because of the regional 
concentration of enrollment, the program was blamed for the demise of numer-
ous rural communities. Sealed bids for long-term land retirement can be used to 
remove cropland from production without over- or under-paying operators to 
remove their land. 
• Long-term land retirement is a supply control and conservation strategy that 
costs less than paying storage and interest for grains already produced. 
• Long-term land retirement programs can adversely affect local agribusiness and 
rural communities. 
• Treasury costs are lower than they would be for annual diversion of the same 
acreage for the same number of years. 
• Increased prices for commodities increase production costs for livestock pro-
ducers and food prices over time. 
• Land retirement can be used to encourage conservation of cropland and 
enhance wildlife preservation practices. 
• Long-term land retirement reduces farmers' flexibility. 
• Retired land, properly cared for, results in greater productivity when put back 
into use, thus possibly exacerbating the excess supply problem. 
• Slippage is generally high because least productive land is removed from pro-
duction. Slippage may be reduced somewhat if whole farms are removed from 
production. 
Policy Tool: 
Policy Area: 
What It Is: 
Objective: 
When Used: 
Experience: 
Consequences: 
Acreage Allotment 
Domestic Farm Policy, Supply Control 
Acreage allotment is a mandatory mechanism to reduce quantity supplied. Acre-
age allotments require that producers plant within a specified amount of land. 
The number of allotment acres for each farmer is set at a given percentage of the 
farmer 's production history. The percentage is set to achieve the desired reduc-
tion in production and thus in quantity supplied. 
To reduce the quantity produced and thus the supply of a given commodity. 
Acreage allotments were used extensively during the 1950s and 1960s for the 
basic commodities. Allotments still exist in tobacco and for peanuts eligible for 
price supports. Allotments have also been used as a means of allocating target 
price benefits (e.g., with rice from 1976 through 1981). 
When acreage allotments were used alone (in the absence of marketing quotas) 
farmers responded by farming the allotment acres more intensely, thus raising 
yields. The result was a tendency for production to return to pre-allotment lev-
els, therefore necessitating further restrictions on allotment size. In some com-
modities, such as tobacco, marketing quotas were imposed to obtain firmer con-
trol over production. 
• Acreage allotments raise domestic prices by reducing production and supply. 
• Benefits from acreage allotment programs are bid into the price of land and/or 
allotments. 
• Acreage allotments restrict ability of farmers to shift acreage in response to 
changes in relative crop prices. 
• When allotments are imposed on one crop, surpluses tend to arise in other 
crops as farmers utilize non-allotment acres to produce those other crops. 
Thus allotments are often imposed on those additional crops. 
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Payment in Kind (PIK) 
Domestic Farm Policy, Supply Control 
Payment in kind is an acreage diversion program with the diversion payment in 
commodity rather than in cash. 
To reduce both production and stocks of grains in the farmer owned reserve and 
cotton in the CCC loan. 
Payment in kind was used in the early 1960s for one year; in 1983 for wheat, 
cotton, corn, sorghum, and rice; and again in 1984 for wheat. The program has 
been used when government controlled stocks reach such unacceptably high lev-
els that a PIK program is feasible. 
PIK is one way to reduce stocks controlled by the government and to move these 
stocks out of government storage. The result is an overall reduction in stocks 
and an increase in domestic prices. Problems occur when the government is 
required to payout more PIK commodity than it owns, as was the case for cotton 
and rice in 1983. A decision that PIK commodities were not subject to the pay-
ment limit encouraged large volume producer participation. Question remains, 
however, regarding the legality of this decision. 
• PIK provides an off-budget method for paying producers to divert cropland. 
• PIK increases domestic prices and food costs while reducing stocks. 
• PIK helps maintain market supplies while curtailing production which results in 
a price stabilizing effect. 
• Program effectiveness in increasing prices depends on farmer participation, 
slippage, and initial level of stocks. 
• PIK reduces the supply available for export. 
• Local communities, agribusiness firms, and livestock producers are adversely 
affected if signup is high. 
• Instead of adjusting excess resources out of crop production, PIK's artificially 
high prices may actually encourage them to stay. 
Policy Tool: 
Policy Area: 
What It Is: 
Objective: 
When Used: 
Experience: 
Consequences: 
Commodity Credit Corporation (CCC) Loan 
Domesti~ Farm Policy, Price Stabilization 
The Commodity Credit Corporation (Ccq makes nonrecourse loans at estab-
lished loan rates to farmers for wheat, feed grains, cotton, sugar, wool, tobacco, 
and honey. The loan, plus interest and storage, can be repaid within 9 to 12 
months and the commodity sold on the cash market. If it is not profitable for 
the farmer to repay the loan even after 9 to 12 months, the CCC accepts the 
commodity in full payment of the loan. Commodity loans are frequently 
referred to as a price support since national season average prices generally do 
not fall below the loan rate. Local prices, on the other hand, can fall below the 
loan for part of the marketing year. 
To add price stability to the market by releasing CCC stocks when prices were 
high and withdrawing stocks from the market when prices were low. A second 
objective was to encourage orderly marketing of commodities throughout the 
marketing year by preventing a market glut at harvest. 
The CCC loan program has existed continuously since 1938 for cotton, wheat, 
and feedgrains. During World War II, the loan rates for basic commodities were 
set at 100 percent of parity to encourage production of crops already in surplus 
and to encourage exports. In other years, the loan rates were set low to avoid 
encouraging production. 
CCC loans were effective at stabilizing prices of feed grains during the 1960s 
when the price of corn was bounded by the loan rate and the CCC release price 
(110 percent of loan). At various times political pressure has caused loan rates to 
be set above equilibrium market prices; as a result (a) the loan rates acted as a 
supply incentive for producers, (b) the CCC acquired large stocks of grains and 
cotton, and (c) the volume of exports declined as commodities were priced out of 
the world market. 
• Loan rates with reasonable release levels act as a price stabilizjng force jn tbe 
market and thus reduce price risk for producers and lead to greater produc-
tion. 
• The CCC loan program extends the marketing period for producers 9 to 12 
months. 
• The CCC loan reduces price risk for farmers thus encouraging excess resources 
to remain in agriculture. 
• High loan rates can effectively price our commodities out of the world market 
necessitating an export subsidy or direct aid to export surplus CCC stocks. 
• Loan rates based on the cost of production tend to increase without regard to 
the marketing clearing price and thus can become a production incentive. 
7 
Policy Tool: 
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Experience: 
Consequences: 
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Farmer Owned Reserve (FOR) 
Domestic Farm Policy, Price Stabilization 
The farmer owned reserve is a 3-year CCC loan for wheat and feed grains. The 
Food and Agriculture Act of 1977 established the FOR as a 3-year extension of 
the CCC loan after grain had been in the regular loan for 9 months. Reserve 
stocks remain in the producers hands until the Secretary of Agriculture author-
izes release. 
To stabilize grain prices and provide producers a longer time period to sell their 
grain. A secondary objective was to establish a food reserve of grains, thus stabi-
lizing grain supplies and making the United States a more dependable supplier. 
The FOR has been in use since 1978 for wheat and feedgrains. The program was 
modified in 1980 to allow direct entry, thus avoiding the 9 months in the regular 
CCC loan. In addition, producers were given a direct entry loan price higher 
than the regular loan rate in 1980, 1981, and 1982. Stocks in the reserve are eli-
gible for release when cash prices reach a level determined in advance by the 
~~~~~>~~ 
The FOR attracts large quantities of stocks when the entry price is set above the 
equilibrium market price. Since its inception in 1977, corn prices have reached 
the FOR release level twice. When that happened corn stocks were released and 
prices stabilized at the release level. Research has shown that the FOR reduces 
the quantity of stocks held by the private sector and causes season average prices 
to be at either the entry price or the release price depending on the supply-de-
mand balance. 
• FOR often results in the accumulation of stocks resulting in substantial storage 
and interest costs. 
• FOR provides farmers 3 years to sell their grain out of the reserve at the 
release level price. 
• Political pressure groups attempt to set the FOR entry price above equilibrium 
market price, thus creating, in effect, an income support program. 
• In the face of declining export demand, there are no provisions to reduce the 
FOR entry or release price. 
• FOR works best when there is a relative supply-demand balance, thus allowing 
prices to move in a range between the entry loan rate and the release price. 
• High loan levels and release prices encourage foreign production and discour-
age U.S. exports. 
• FOR supports prices only when producer participation is high and adequate 
storage is available. 
Policy Tool: 
Policy Area: 
What It Is: 
Objective: 
When Used: 
Experience: 
Consequences: 
Target Prices and Deficiency Payments 
Domestjc Farm Policy, Income Support 
Deficiency payments are paid to farmers to make up the difference between a 
price determined to achieve a politically acceptable income level (target price) 
and the average market price. Deficiency payments are made on each farm's 
actual production acres and farm program yield. The farm program yield is 
based on each farm's yield history. Target prices were set initially to reflect an 
average cost of production. 
Deficiency payments were initiated to raise and stabilize farmer incomes to the 
level of the nonfarm popuation, while allowing farm prices to be competitive in 
the export market. 
Target prices were authorized for cotton in 1970 and for cotton, wheat, corn, 
sorghum, and oats in the Agriculture and Consumer Protection Act of 1973. 
Deficiency payments are paid for wheat and feed grains if the average cash price 
in the first 5 months of the marketing year is less than the target price. In the 
case of cotton, the deficiency payments are made if the average cash price for the 
calendar year is less than the target price. The payment rate is the difference 
between the target price and the relevant average price received by farmers or 
the target price and the loan rate, whichever is smaller. 
Initially, target prices were set to reflect changes in the cost of production and 
yield. Much debate ensued over what constituted the cost of production. A 1977 
change in the target price formula removed the possibility of reducing target 
prices to reflect yield increases. The 1981 farm program set target prices for 
cotton, wheat, and corn for 1982-85 without regard to inflation, crop yields, or 
production costs. Excess production and high government costs resulted. 
• Target prices set above market clearing levels stimulate production, reduce 
market prices, and thereby reduce food costs. 
• By reducing market prices, target prices allow U. S. farm products to be more 
competitive in the world market while supporting farm income, e.g., an 
implicit export subsidy. This gives them a major advantage over support 
prices for raising producer income. 
• Arbitrarily setting target prices above the expected market price can result in 
large treasury outlays. 
• Deficiency payments provide income support up to $50,000 to large-scale pro-
ducers and little support to small-scale operators because payments are based 
on production. 
• Deficiency payments reduce income risk for producers and increase their abil-
ity to obtain financing. 
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Policy Area: 
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Objective: 
When Used: 
Experience: 
Consequences: 
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Disaster Program 
Domestic Farm Policy, Income Support 
Low yield and prevented plantings payments are paid to producers who, through 
no fault of their own, are unable to plant their crop or harvest a normal yield. 
To reduce yield and planting risk faced by producers by providing them a rela-
tively free (program compliance necessary) crop insurance program. 
Disaster payments were first authorized by the Agriculture and Consumer Pro-
tection Act of 1973. Disaster payment benefits were available from 1973 to 1981 
to producers who were in compliance with other program provisions. Low yield 
payments were made to producers who were prevented from harvesting less than 
66 percent (75 percent for cotton) of their normal yield. The provisions of the 
disaster program were dropped in 1982 to reduce government costs and encour-
age participation in the FCIC all-risk crop insurance. 
The disaster programs were very expensive and encouraged expanded production 
of crops in high risk areas. Low yield and prevented plantings payments were 
received mainly by dryland producers in the Great Plains and producers in the 
Delta States. 
• High treasury costs were associated with disaster programs. 
• Disaster programs provided producers income assistance when they needed it 
the most, namely, after a natural disaster. 
• Availability of the disaster program increased producer participation in volun-
tary acreage reduction programs. 
• Disaster programs encouraged the production of high risk crops in low rainfall 
and floodplain areas and the use of marginally productive land. 
• In latter years, disaster payments were subject to a $100,000 payment limita-
tion, thus discouraging program participation by large-scale operators. 
• Benefits from the program were bid into the market value of marginally pro-
ductive, high-risk cropland. 
Policy Tool: 
Policy Area: 
What It Is: 
Objective: 
When Used: 
Experience: 
Consequences: 
Federal All Risk Crop Insurance (FCIC) 
Domest~c Farm Policy, Income Support 
Federal all risk crop insurance is a subsidized low-yield insurance program for 
farmers. 
To provide federally subsidized crop insurance to producers unable to obtain 
adequate crop insurance on their own; also to replace the low-yield and pre-
vented plantings disaster program for grains and cotton with an insurance pro-
gram available to all producers of major crops. 
FCIC for wheat was first authorized under the 1938 Federal Crop Insurance Act. 
Federal crop insurance was available only for wheat from 1938 through 1941 
when it was expanded to cotton. The program was suspended in 1943 because of 
low producer participation but revived in 1945 with a reduction in counties 
insured. After 1948 the program was extended to more counties and crops, 
including vegetables and fruits. The program was substantially modified in a 
1980 farm bill to provide a 30-percent federal cost subsidy. In 1981 the program 
was expanded to all counties in the United States and to most major crops. 
Federal crop insurance has not garnered high levels of producer participation. 
Participation has been the highest in high-risk, nonirrigated, low-rainfall areas. 
Problems have been encountered in developing an actuarially sound premium 
structure and in adequately marketing the program to producers. Experience 
indicates FCIC has a high cost of administration relative to commercial insur-
ance. 
• Limited acceptance by farmers leads to adverse loss experience. 
• Low participation by producers results in high loss ratios and high treasury 
costs. 
• The program provides more extensive coverage than commercial hail insurance 
at subsidized rates. 
• High premiums discourage widespread producer participation and low partici-
pation requires high premiums to make the program actuarially sound. 
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What It Is: 
Objective: 
When Used: 
Experience: 
Consequences: 
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Income Insurance 
Domestic 'Farm Policy, Income Support 
Income insurance would be an expansion of the FCIC all-risk crop insurance. It 
would insure both a producer 's yield and price risk; i.e., total crop receipts. 
To stabilize farm incomes from the adverse effects of natural disasters and low 
prices and thus replace all supply control and price support programs with a 
comprehensive farm income insurance program. 
An income insurance program for farmers has not been used in the United 
States. The 1981 farm program authorized an investigation into the feasibility of 
a federally subsidized income insurance program for farmers. 
None 
• An actuarially sound farm income insurance program may reduce current 
treasury outlays. 
• Producers' premiums would likely be unacceptably high, and since the policy 
replaces a "free" risk protection program, producers would likely oppose the 
program. 
• Participation by farmers would likely be very low, as is the case with federal 
crop insurance. 
• Political pressure to reduce premiums below their actuarially sound levels 
would be substantial. Premiums set too low would lead to excessive govern-
ment costs and could cause the program to act as a supply incentive even in 
the face of surpluses. 
• The program is flexible enough to be used for both expanding and contracting 
supplies and for shifting ptoduction (acreage) from one crop to another. 
• The program would discourage production in high risk areas. 
• Research indicates that the high correlation between crop prices and yields 
among regions would cause the program to fail since losses caused by either 
low yields or low prices would be widespread and catastrophic for the treasury. 
Policy Tool: 
Policy Area: 
What It Is: 
Objective: 
When Used: 
Experience: 
Consequences: 
Cost Sharing Programs 
Domest.ic Farm Policy, Income Support 
A cost-sharing program is a means by which the costs of farm programs are 
shared between producers and the government. The producers' share of the cost 
is covered through a checkoff per unit of product marketed. The magnitude of 
the checkoff per unit depends on the degree of cost sharing -- 50-percent cost 
sharing would involve a higher checkoff than if producers shared only 30 percent 
of the cost -- and the size of the commodity surplus. The higher the checkoff, 
the lower the effective level of price support for the commodity. 
To make the level of income support more responsive to the magnitude of the 
surplus and to help defray a portion of government program costs. 
The 1981 farm bill provided a cost sharing program for tobacco. A 1982 farm 
bill amendment provided for a cost sharing program in dairy. Cost sharing pro-
grams were implemented for both tobacco and milk, but only after a serious 
political threat that the whole government price support program for these com-
modities might be withdrawn. 
It is too early to tell how either program is working. Producer resistance has 
been substantial to the "tax" under each program. However, with high govern-
ment costs for virtually all commodity programs, producer cost sharing could be 
a required feature of all future farm policy legislation. 
• The checkoff provides an automatic adjustment of the level of income support 
for farmers as government expenditures rise. 
• The political hassle of adjusting income support downward when supports are 
initially set too high is avoided. 
• The checkoff reduces government costs and, thereby, increases the political 
acceptability of farm programs by urban congressmen and taxpayers. 
• The checkoff makes the level of income support more responsive to market 
forces. 
l3 
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Experience: 
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GATT (General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade) 
International Trade, Trade Barrier Reduction 
GAIT is a multilateral United Nations treaty among more than 80 governments, 
including the United States. GATI contains a code of principles and provides a 
forum for consultation and dispute settlement. Five principles govern GAIT: 
1. Trade must be nondiscriminatory. 
2. Domestic industries should be protected mainly by tariffs as opposed 
to nontariff barriers (quotas). 
3. Tariffs agreed upon are binding. with provision for compensation if 
violated. 
4. Consultations are provided to settle disputes. 
5. GAIT procedures may be waived on agreement of the members with 
provision for compensation. Barriers in existence when GAIT was 
established are legal until negotiated away. 
To liberalize and expand trade among nations through negotiated reductions in 
trade barriers. These actions are designed to prevent the development of rounds 
of retaliatory trade barriers. 
GAIT came into existence after World War II. Trade barrier reductions have 
been accomplished in three rounds of negotiation -- the Dillon Round (1960-61), 
which provided assured European Economic Community (EEC) duty-free 
entrance for soybeans and cotton; the Kennedy Round (1963-67), which resulted 
in tariff reductions on a wide range of farm products; and the Tokyo Round 
(1973-79), which reduced nontariff barriers on a limited number of commodities. 
While experiencing substantial initial success, the most difficult problems that 
remain in securing trade barrier reductions are those rooted in the domestic farm 
policies of the participating countries. Classic examples include the EEC Com-
mon Agricultural Policy (CAP) and U.S. price supports for dairy products. 
• GA TI increased overall trade among nations. thus expanding opportunities for 
exports. 
• GAIT provides a forum for settling disputes. 
• GA TI establishes a code of fair trade. 
• GAIT restricts the latitude of the participating countries in subsidizing exports 
and engaging in other practices. Thus in the short run GAIT places partici-
pants at a disadvantage. 
• It is hard to enforce the GAIT principles against the major country members. 
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Monetary Export Subsidies 
International Trade, Export Subsidies 
Monetary subsidies to exporters are direct dollar subsidies per unit of commodity 
sold. 
To make the U.S. commodity price competitive in the world market and thus 
expand markets. 
Export subsidies are necessary to export agricultural commodities when U.S. 
price supports are above world prices. Overt monetary subsidies of exports are 
seldom made because they clearly violate the provisions of GATT. Under those 
provisions the United States could be required to pay damages to the countries 
injured by such subsidies. EEC subsidies do not violate GATT since they were in 
place as a part of the Common Agricultural Policy at the time GATT was nego-
tiated. The last major U.S. direct monetary export subsidy was in the 1972 Rus-
sian grain deal when a subsidy of approximately $.60 per bushel of wheat was 
provided. Political considerations are obviously involved in the use of such sub-
sidies. 
Export subsidies are overt methods of subsidizing exports. As such, they are 
readily determined to be a violation of GATT and invite retaliation from com-
petitors if they increase market share. There is more pressure to use export sub-
sidies when the dollar is overvalued with respect to other currencies. 
• The effective export price is lowered to make U.S. commodity prices competi-
tive in the world market. The result is to expand exports. 
• Monetary subsidies run a high risk of inviting retaliation. 
• Monetary subsidies run a high risk of violating GATT. 
• CCC stocks are reduced. 
• Long-run price relief is provided for U.S. producers in the face of low world 
prices. 
• Monetary subsidies can be expensive in terms of both money and image. 
Policy Tool: 
Policy Area: 
What It Is: 
Objective: 
When Used: 
Experience: 
Consequences: 
Two-Price Plan 
International Trade, Export Subsidies 
A two-price plan discriminates between the domestic and the foreign market by 
charging a higher price for domestic sales than for foreign sales. Exports are, 
therefore, indirectly subsidized by the higher domestic price. 
To raise the level of producer returns while preventing the accumulation of large 
surplus commodity stocks. 
Before World War II and the negotiation of GATT, two-price plans were used 
extensively to support farm income. Since ~he negotiation of GATT, the opera-
tion of two-price plans has been restricted largely to marketing orders. 
Two-price plans, in essence, make the world market a residual and largely 
unprofitable market. Advocating reduced trade barriers and operating two-price 
plans are obviously inconsistant. 
• Producer income increases if the demand in the domestic market is more price 
responsive than in the export market. 
• Surplus stocks do not accumulate in the face of high domestic price supports. 
• Lower export market prices create the potential for price warring conditions. 
• The world market tends to become unprofitable when two-price plans are used 
extensively. 
• Controversial method of being competitive would draw public media attention. 
• Domestic market is placed at a disadvantage relative to the foreign buyers. 
• In the case of cotton the use of man-made fibers is encouraged. 
• Imported textiles are made even more competitive with domestic production. 
• Feed grain costs are increased to livestock producers and food costs are 
increased to consumers. 
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Blended Credit 
International Trade, Export Subsidies 
Blended credit is a form of export subsidy which combines government export 
credit and credit guarantees with commercial credit in a single package to reduce 
the effective interest rate. Government export credit is provided in a program 
known as GSM-S. The credit guarantee program is known as GSM-102. 
To make U.S. credit terms competitive with those offered by other exporting 
countries. 
Blended credit is available only when appropriations are provided by the Con-
gress. Tight budgets have made blended credit available only to a limited num-
ber of countries and commodities. Countries are selected based on magnitude of 
surpluses and competitive need, as well as on diplomatic and domestic political 
considerations. The blended credit program was most recently initiated in Octo-
ber 1982. 
During the period used, blended credit facilitated the opening of markets for U.S. 
commodities in competition with other countries. It is particularly useful for 
those developing country markets where credit and credit guarantees are critical. 
The pressure for a blended credit program increases when a strong dollar reduces 
exports. 
• The United States is made more competitive in the face of other countries' 
subsidized export credit programs. 
• A basis is provided for penetrating new export markets -- particularly in devel-
oping country markets. 
• Compared to other forms of export subsidies, blended credit runs less risk of 
creating retaliatory trade war conditions. 
• Expansion of subsidized credit encourages other countries to expand their pro-
grams, thus creating the potential for larger programs (treasury costs) over 
time. 
• The potential for high government costs is created by blended credit programs. 
• If successful in expanding exports, blended credit raises domestic food costs and 
production costs for livestock producers. 
Policy Tool: 
Policy Area: 
What It Is: 
Objective: 
When Used: 
Experience: 
Consequences: 
P.L. 480 (Food for Peace) 
International Trade, Export Subsidies 
Public Law 480 provides for concessional sales of commodities involving price or 
credit terms that contain substantial U.S. subsidies. Exports are made under 
three P.L. 480 programs: 
• Title I involves sales for dollars under low interest rates with up to 40 
years repayment. 
• Title II involves emergency food relief directed to nutritionally vul-
nerable groups. 
• Title III involves commodity aid as part of a development package. 
Multiyear commitments are tied to specific development actions. 
To dispose of surplus commodities, develop markets, provide emergency food 
aid, and assist friendly nations in development. 
Authorized by the Agricultural Trade Development Act of 1954, P.L. 480 was 
used to export as much as one-third of export sales during the 1950s and 1960s 
when loan rates were generally maintained above world prices. Since then P.L. 
480 sales have generally been in the $1-2 billion range. Countries are selected 
for assistance based on diplomatic and political considerations as well as need. 
Commodities selected are influenced by the magnitude of surplus stocks. The 
Secretary of State makes the final decision on who gets P.L. 480 aid. 
P.L. 480 is credited with having built such important commercial markets for 
farm products as Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, Brazil, and Spain. The need to get 
commodities moving through P.L. 480 is frequently frustrated by foreign policy 
considerations. Title III aid is considered by recipients to be worth 10 cents on 
the dollar, thus an economically inefficient method to provide aid. 
• A government alternative is provided for exports when the United States is 
priced out of the world market. 
• Commodity aid is combined with development assistance thus being more 
politically acceptable. 
• Government stocks of commodities are reduced. 
• Long-term development of markets is promoted. 
• If used extensively, it becomes too costly and the U.S. is subject to the charge 
of dumping commodities on the world market. 
• P.L. 480 provides the State Department with a diplomatic tool that can be used 
in foreign policy negotiations. 
• P.L. 480 sales may displace commercial sales. 
• Too much commodity aid can be a disincentive for production in developing 
countries and can make them overly dependent on imports. 
• Hunger and starvation assistance is provided. 
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Export PIK (Payment in Kind) 
International Trade, Export Subsidies 
Under export PIK, the government provides an in-kind export commodity bonus 
in return for a regular commercial purchase of an agreed upon magnitude. For · 
example, if a country purchases a million metric tons of wheat, it might receive 
an additional 100,000 metric tons of PIK wheat from CCC stocks. The 100,000 
metric ton bonus is the export PIK. 
To make the United States commodity price competitive in the world market and 
thus expand export markets. 
Export PIK was first used in a 1983 flour sale to Egypt. Legislation is currently 
pending in Congress that would make export PIK a more permanent part of U.S. 
international trade policy. Export PIK would be available only to a limited num-
ber of countries and for a limited number of commodities that are in surplus. 
Export PIK was used to virtually capture the 1983 Egyptian flour market for the 
United States. Other flour exporting countries, such as France, were upset, 
although no overt retaliatory steps were taken against the United States. 
• The United States is kept competitive in the world market, even in the face of 
reduced demand and loan rates that may be above the world market. 
• Export PIK is less overt than direct monetary export subsidies and thus not as 
likely to invite either retaliation or GAIT sanction. 
• Government stocks of commodities are reduced. 
• An export alternative is provided by export PIK as long as the CCC owns suffi-
cient stocks. 
• Export PIK is a violation of at least the spirit of GAIT. 
Policy Tool: 
Policy Area: 
What It Is: 
Objective: 
When Used: 
Experience: 
Consequences: 
Import Quotas 
International Trade, Quotas 
Import quotas are quantity limits placed on the amount of individual commodi-
ties that can be imported into the United States. Limits are generally allocated 
among potential importing countries. Specific limits are frequently negotiated in 
the form of voluntary restraints to avoid more restrictive limits. The specific size 
of quotas may be either legislated, negotiated, or determined by executive action. 
Those determined by executive action under Section 22 as interfering with the 
operation of the price support program are recommended by the International 
Trade Commission and are imposed by the President. 
To prevent unrestricted quantities of certain commodities from entering the 
United States and unduly suppressing prices' or interfering with the operation of 
the price support program. 
Beef import quotas have been mandated by the Congress. Cheese import quotas 
imposed to protect the price support program established in 1949 have been the 
subject of negotiation and agreement under GATT. Import quotas are also 
imposed on sugar under Section 22. Import quotas exist on textile imports as a 
means of avoiding irreparable harm to the domestic industry. 
The imposition of import quotas is highly political. Even though the Interna-
tional Trade Commission recommendations to the President are based on objec-
tive criteria, the ultimate Presidential decision is highly political. The existence 
of U.S. import quotas has made it difficult to get other countries to reduce trade 
barriers. Japan argues that its beef import quotas are no different from the beef 
import quotas of the United States. 
• Import quotas r~strict available supplies and raise domestic prices. 
• Textile import restrictions reduce export demand for U.S. cotton lint but may 
increase sales of domestic mills. Less overall demand is likely because of 
higher ultimate consumer product prices. 
• Without import quotas on price supported commodities, the CCC would 
acquire a larger quantity of commodities under the price support program. 
• Import quotas result in windfall profits to licensed importers. 
• Supply control aspects of import quotas result in greater price fluctuations than 
would occur in a free market. 
• Efficiency of production plays no role in determining competitiveness under a 
system of quotas. 
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Export Embargoes 
International Trade, Embargoes 
Export embargoes set absolute limits on quantities that can be exported. An 
export embargo does not have to involve zero exports. It may state, for example, 
that up to 8 million metric tons (MMT) of grain may be exported. At 8 MMT 
the embargo goes into effect. Embargoes may be either general and apply to all 
countries or specific and apply to only one country. They may apply to one 
commodity or to all commodities. 
• To hold down U.S. commodity prices, 
• To prevent shortages of commodities, 
• To achieve a foreign policy objective, or 
• Any combination of the above. 
Since 1970 export embargoes have been imposed three times: 
• In 1973 an embargo was placed on the export of soybeans to provide assurance 
that poultry and hog producers would have a sufficient supply of soybean meal 
to continue efficient production. 
• In 1975 an embargo was placed on exports of grain sales to the Soviet Union 
after concern spread about increasing food prices and the rumor that bread 
prices would rise to $1 per loaf. 
• In January 1980 an embargo was placed on all exports to the Soviet Union 
after the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and the subsequent tensions in Poland. 
This embargo was not lifted until April 1981. 
Provisions of the 1981 Farm Bill require that the loan rates for grain and cotton 
be set at 100 percent of parity if only agricultural exports are embargoed. 
Embargoes have been a major factor in reduced confidence in the United States 
as a dependable supplier. Therefore, the U.S. share of world trade has declined. 
Serious questions also exist concerning the effectiveness of embargoes as a policy 
tool or the willingness of the United States to enforce an embargo. 
• Embargoes reduce U.S. export sales and lower prices. 
• Embargoes reduce confidence in the United States as a dependable supplier. 
• Embargoes encourage other countries to increase production as a means of 
achieving self -sufficiency. 
• Embargoes encourage competitive exporting countries to increase production. 
• It is difficult to prevent the intended embargoed country from importing the 
commodity from another source. 
Policy Tool: 
Policy Area: 
What It Is: 
Objective: 
When Used: 
Experience: 
Consequences: 
Sanctity of Contracts 
Internati~nal Trade, Embargoes 
Sanctity of contracts provides that if an embargo on exports is imposed, exporters 
will still be able to fulfill their contract obligations for a period of 270 days after 
the imposition. Sanctity of contract provisions were included as an amendment 
to the extension of the Commodity Futures Trading Commission Bill in 1983. 
To assure importing countries that the United States is a dependable supplier and 
will deliver on the contract terms. A secondary objective is to reduce the impact 
of export embargoes on exporting firms and producers. 
After lifting the Soviet grain embargo in April 1981, producer organizations and 
exporting firms applied increasing pressure on the Reagan administration for 
sanctity of contracts. In 1982 President Reagan provided assurance that he would 
allow increased purchases by the Soviets with sanctity of contracts. This principle 
was written into law in early 1983 and applies to all agricultural export sales. 
The abrupt imposition of the Russian grain embargo in January 1980 left U.S. 
producers and exporters with delivery commitments that were disallowed. While 
the U.S. government provided compensation to exporters for losses incurred, 
long-term injury ensued to the reputation of the United States as a reliable agri-
cultural exporter. This was one of several factors leading to a decline in the U.S. 
share of total world trade in the early 1980s. 
• The United States is viewed as a more reliable supplier of agricultural exports. 
• Importers know that when they sign a contract for delivery of U.S. agricultural 
products, there will not be governmental interference with performance on it. 
• Exporters are assured their sales will be allowed. 
• Producers are shielded from the immediate effects of embargoes. 
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Long-Term Bilateral Trade Agreements 
International Trade, Trade Agreements 
A long-term bilateral trade agreement is a contract between two countries speci-
fying the quantity of a commodity to be traded over a certain time period. Bilat-
eral trade agreements normally run for a period of 3 to 5 years, although they 
may be simple I-year agreements that are renewed annually. The agreements 
normally specify the minimum quantity to be purchased and the maximum quan-
tity to be supplied. Generally no provisions exist with regard to the price to be 
paid. 
To provide supply assurance for the importing country and market assurance for 
the exporting country. In addition, trade agreements are utilized to normalize 
trade, develop markets, and retain markets for farm products. 
Trade agreements have become increasingly common since a world food shortage 
was experienced in the early 1970s. The most publicized agreement was the 
5-year contract negotiated with the Soviets in 1975 which contained an agreement 
to purchase a minimum of 6 million metric tons of grain with the United States 
agreeing to supply at least 8 million metric tons. In the early 1980s the United 
States became cool to the trade agreement concept while Australia and Canada 
signed agreements with several countries including the USSR and China. In 
1983, the Reagan Administration changed policy and renegotiated a new long-
term trade agreement with the Soviets requiring purchases of between 9 and 12 
million metric tons of grain. 
Trade agreements are a means of getting a foot in the door of a market on a 
long-term basis. The quantities specified in the agreement have generally been 
less than the normal trading levels. Unwillingness to sign trade agreements in the 
early 1980s probably reduced the U.S. market share in export markets such as the 
USSR. 
• The total volume of trade tends to be increased and stabilized between the par-
ties to the agreement. 
• Importing countries outside of the agreement may be denied a source of the 
commodity if supplies become short. 
• Exporting countries outside of the agreement may be denied market outlets 
when supplies are plentiful. 
• Trade agreements are, in essence, barriers to trade in that they tie up markets 
over long time periods. 
• Trade agreements cause greater fluctuations in pricing since they effectively 
reduce the world supply which can be traded. 
Policy Tool: 
Policy Area: 
What It Is: 
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International Commodity Agreements 
International Trade, Trade Agreements 
An international commodity agreement is a multilateral agreement among coun-
tries to affect the terms of trade. The terms of trade affected by an international 
commodity agreement may include the price level, quantity sold, quantity pro-
duced, or quantity held in reserve. Legally, commodity agreements are treaties 
among the participating nations. 
To raise the world price above the equilibrium levels, to stabilize price, and to 
provide increased supply assurance. 
Commodity agreements have been used mos~ extensively on wheat, being first 
established in 1949. Currently they are used extensively among developing 
countries on commodities ranging from tin to sugar and coffee. Interestingly, 
OPEC might also be looked upon as an international commodity agreement. 
Commodity agreements have had a reasonably good history of stabilizing prices 
as long as burdensome surpluses or shortages do not exist. Commodity agree-
ments designed to raise prices have a tendancy to fall apart because of a lack of 
control over production. To be truly effective, commodity agreements require 
close coordination of domestic farm programs with the activities of international 
commodity agreements. 
• Commodity agreements provide increased price stability. 
• Domestic prices are raised. 
• Exchange of information among countries on market conditions is increased. 
• When prices are raised, excess supplies frequently accumulate. 
• Unless commodity agreements are well coordinated with the domestic farm 
programs of the participating countries, they tend to breakdown. 
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Barter 
International Trade, Trade Agreements 
Barter is trade among two or more countries or firms involving the exchange of 
goods and/or services of equal value instead of currency or credit transactions as 
payment for a commodity. 
To facilitate trade with developing countries experiencing short-run financial dif-
ficulties which make traditional commercial trade impossible. To obtain sources 
of supply of other commodities that might not otherwise be available. 
The first U.S. experience in a barter agreement in 15 years took place in 1982 
with an exchange of surplus powdered milk to Jamaica for bauxite. 
Barter has limited ability to expand exports. Rather, it is more of a temporary 
measure to maintain an existing market during periods of adverse economic con-
ditions. Its greatest potential appears to be as a market development tool for 
developing countries with mineral or strategic metals of importance to the U.S. 
defense and industrial sectors. The biggest problem in barter is matching needs 
with products. 
• Barter helps maintain export levels. 
• Barter provides increased potential for developing commercial markets for 
agricultural products. 
• Barter has limited applicability because of the required coincidence of need. 
• Barter may displace commercial sales. 
• Barter value generally approximates relative world market value of the com-
modities bartered. 
MARKETING PROGRAMS 
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Commodity Distribution 
Marketing Programs, Demand Expansion, Food Assistance 
Commodity distribution programs provide primarily staple food products direct 
from the government to needy households. Commodities provided are generally 
in surplus, although nonsurplus food products have been provided in times of 
high unemployment. Commodities are distributed to those households who 
qualify according to specific eligibility standards--normally participation in some 
welfare program or unemployed. 
To expand the demand for farm products, utilize surplus commodities, and 
improve nutrition of needy consumers. 
Commodity distribution was a forerunner of the food stamp program. Such 
direct distribution programs date back at least to the Great Depression era. 
However, even after widespread adoption of the food stamp program in the 
1960s, commodity distribution has from time to time resurfaced either to dispose 
of surplus government stocks or to deal with problems of unemployment and 
poverty. 
Commodity distribution programs are costly because of the necessary network of 
qualification, processing, storage transportation, and distribution systems. With 
the advent of food stamps in the 1960s, the direct distribution system was dis-
mantled. In the 1980s when surpluses and unemployment reappeared, pressure 
grew to once again distribute commodities--beginning with cheese. Rather than 
establishing a distribution system, the Reagan administration provided the com-
modities to volunteer welfare groups such as churches. It was found, however, 
that under this system many unqualified recipients received the products. 
• Product movement is expanded to the extent that the quantities given away 
exceed normal recipient consumption levels. Reduced expenditures for dis-
tributed products results in purchases of other foods and/or nonfood items. 
• The commodities given away displace retail sales of the commodities and their 
substitutes. If people are given commodities, they certainly will not buy them 
or the substitutes for them. Food processors and retailers thus tend to be 
opposed to direct distribution programs. 
• For commodities in surplus that are acquired under price support programs, 
such as dairy products, the government will end up actually purchasing more 
products to the extent that those receiving the products, buy less of them 
through grocery stores. 
• Nutrition levels of recipients are improved to the extent of the nutritional value 
of the additional quantities or items consumed. 
Policy Tool: 
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School Lunch 
Marketing Programs, Demand Expansion, Food Assistance 
The school lunch program provides assistance to schools through direct com-
modity distribution, cash subsidies, and, at times, subsidies for the purchase of 
equipment. Over time this program has been expanded to encompass both 
breakfast and lunch. Free or subsidized meals are given to children from 
low-income households. 
To improve the nutritional levels of school-age children and assure that they have 
at least one nutritionally balanced meal on school days. 
The school lunch program has been in existence since the 1930s. Over time it 
has gradually put increasing emphasis on cash as opposed to commodity distribu-
tion. Schools have had increasing impact on the specific commodities obtained 
under the program. In the early 1980s, the program fed nearly 30 million stu-
dents at a federal cost of $5 billion. 
The school lunch program began as a depression measure to support prices and 
to improve nutritional levels for all school children. From its inception through 
much of the 1960s, emphasis was placed on distributing surplus commodities in a 
nutritionally balanced relationship. Schools, however, gradually wanted more to 
say about what was received. In addition, increasing costs of in-school prepara-
tion, relative to institutional and fast-food preparation, led to increased pressure 
to provide a larger proportion of cash subsidies relative to commodities. Increas-
ing cost of meals, led to school lunch and breakfast subsidies being restricted to 
children from low-income households. One of the main problems with the pro-
gram has beer; complaints about the quality of meals served. Pressure always 
exists to provide a larger proportion of cash assistance. 
• The demand for food used in the school lunch program is increased. 
• Nutritional levels of school-age children are increased--particularly of lower 
income households. 
• While commodities distributed are a less important proportion of the total food 
used, the school lunch program continues to provide an important outlet. for 
surplus dairy products, meat, fruits, and vegetables. 
• The development of a large institutional food service sector designed to serve 
this very large program has been fostered. 
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Women, Infants, and Children (WIC) Program 
Marketing Programs, Demand Expansion, Food Assistance 
The WIC program combines direct commodity distribution with nutrition educa-
tion. Most WIC recipients probably are also on food stamps or aid to families 
with dependent children. Nutrition education programs teach the recipients how 
to combine commodities with food expenditure dollars most effectively to 
improve nutrition and family living standards. Many of the recipients are single 
mothers with very low incomes and pre-school children. 
To provide low-income mothers with a complete assistance program designed to 
improve nutrition levels for the family as a whole. 
The WIC program began on an experimental basis in the early 1960s and has 
experienced almost continual expansion since. Participation in the program has a 
tendency to increase in times of recession and increased unemployment. 
Although WIC has been criticized for its predominantly unwed mothers constitu-
ency, studies demonstrate it to be one of the most effective programs in improv-
ing nutrition levels. This results largely from the combination of monetary, 
commodity, and nutrition education assistance. Attempts to cut back on the WIC 
program (as a cost reducing measure) have consistently failed under the weight of 
studies showing the positive impact on nutrition and resulting broad based "hun-
ger lobby" support. 
• Nutrition education programs result in increased consumption of foods nor-
mally considered to be part of a nutritionally balanced diet--particularly poul-
try, milk, cereals, fruits, and vegetables. 
• Commodities distributed tend to be in surplus and/or have particular nutri-
tional value. 
• Commodities distributed partially displace commercial retail sales of these 
products and their substitutes. 
• Overall recipient nutritional level is demonstrably improved. 
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Food Stamps 
Marketing Programs, Demand Expansion, Food Assistance 
The food stamp program provides eligible recipients with stamps having an 
equivalent cash value. Eligibility is determined on the basis of income levels in 
relation to established poverty guidelines. Level of assistance is based on a 
USDA "thrifty food budget" covering the cost of commodities needed to achieve 
a balanced diet. Higher levels of assistance are provided for lower incomes and 
larger family sizes. 
To provide income assistance for the purchase of food by low-income households 
and thereby expand the demand for food as well as improve nutritional levels of 
recipients. 
The food stamp program, while first used in the 1930s, began in earnest as a 
long-term food assistance program in the early 1960s and has since mushroomed 
to a social program with more than 20 million recipients and costing about $12 
billion in the early 1980s. Food manufacturers and retailers actively supported 
the conversion from direct commodity distribution to food stamps because food 
stamps do not displace commercial sales (see Commodity Distribution). 
The merits of the food stamp program have been extensively debated. Major 
concerns regarding the program involve who should be eligible, the level of assis-
tance, the commodities allowed to be purchased with stamps, and the potential 
for program abuse. Among the advocates of change are some who would prefer 
going back to commodity distribution and others who would prefer giving recipi-
ents cash (referred to as "cashing out"). Some advocate moving food stamps out 
of USDA. 
• Consumption of food is increased. The largest increases occur in the demand 
for meat, milk, and poultry. 
• Some farm-state congressmen argue that the food stamp program helps them to 
get farm legislation through the Congress because major farm bills with food 
program components invariably attract urban interest. 
• Nutritional levels of recipients are improved, although not as much as under 
such programs as WIC. 
• Food retailers realize direct benefits--particularly those in lower income neigh-
borhoods. 
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32 
Cashing Out, Welfare Reform 
Marketing Programs, Demand Expansion, Food Assistance 
Cashing out would provide food assistance in cash rather than commodities or 
food stamps. All food and income assistance programs would be consolidated 
into a single cash payment. 
To provide income assistance to low-income households. 
While cash has not yet been substituted for food stamps, over time there has 
been gradual but persistent movement in the direction of providing a larger pro-
portion of cash, as opposed to commodity or food stamp, assistance: Food 
stamps were substituted for direct commodity distribution, and cash subsidies to 
schools have become increasingly important relative to commodities. 
Cash has provided schools greater flexibility in the ultimate use of the assistance. 
Thus it is argued to result in a greater increase in student satisfaction. The cost 
of running several individual programs each having different eligibility standards 
has become increasingly high. There are those who believe that such consumer-
oriented policy changes have come to so dominate USDA, that producer-oriented 
programs have taken a back seat. 
• The total welfare bill would be reduced as program duplications are eliminated. 
• Food consumption would fall if the current equivalent level of cash assistance 
were provided. 
• Prices of surplus commodities would fluctuate more as government outlets for 
surplus commodities are reduced. 
• Food assistance programs would be moved out of USDA and would not be part 
of the farm bill deliberations, thus reducing the potential for obtaining urban 
support for farm programs. 
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When Used: 
Experience: 
Consequences: 
Foreign Market Development 
Marketing Programs, Demand Expansion 
Foreign market development activities of the United States government involve 
assisting firms or producer organizations in selling products abroad. These pro-
grams, managed by the Foreign Agriculture Service (FAS) in the USDA, are 
planned, implemented, evaluated, and financed jointly by the F AS and the coop-
erator organizations. They emphasize market information and technical assis-
tance in servicing the needs of importing countries to utilize products effectively, 
enhance buyer awareness, and educate consumers. Producer program costs are 
generally financed through a checkoff program on commodities sold (see also 
Checkoff Programs). 
To expand export demand for farm products. 
Foreign market development activities depend heavily on producer, processor, 
and handler initiative to develop and finance a joint FAS-industry cooperator 
program. While F AS through its agricultural counselors has a general responsi-
bility to promote exports, the greatest effort is devoted to those products where 
cooperator programs exist. 
Cooperator programs that are well conceived and financed are effective at 
expanding the demand as long as the commodity is available at competitive 
prices. It is difficult, if not impossible, to expand export markets for U.S. farm 
products when our prices are higher than the world price. 
• The quantity of products exported is increased. 
• Increased producer understanding of international markets is developed. 
• Cost of operating the market development program is shared by a large num-
ber of producers, making it more cost effective (see also Checkoff Programs). 
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34 
Domestic Market Development 
Marketing Programs, Demand Expansion 
Domestic market development programs assist producers in raising funds 
required to carry out generic promotion and advertising programs. In addition, 
provision is made for refunds to producers desiring not to participate and audits 
of the use of funds (see also Checkoff Programs). Such programs are authorized 
on an individual commodity basis under either Congressional or state legislative 
authority. 
To expand the domestic demand for farm products. 
Domestic market development programs develop only on producer initiative. 
Producers have to be organized to obtain the checkoff legislation or marketing 
order programs needed to implement a market development program. Market 
development programs have been most extensive in milk, cotton, and oranges, 
although programs have existed also in wheat and potatoes. Several of the mar-
keting orders contain provisions for the collection of funds needed for market 
development activities. 
Most producer domestic market development programs are generic -- promote 
the product in general as opposed to a particular brand of the product. In a lim-
ited number of instances (e.g., cotton), significant resources are devoted to joint 
advertising -- subsidizing the advertising of innovative new uses of the product 
even though it is branded. Research indicates brand promotion and joint adver-
tising programs are more effective than generic advertising. 
• A well-conceived and well-researched producer-oriented advertising program 
has the potential for raising producer returns through demand expansion. 
• Promotion and advertising programs are high cost and difficult to evaluate. 
• Promotion and advertising programs must be geared to the product available 
and the size of the market. 
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Checkoff Programs 
Marketing. Programs, Demand Expansion 
Checkoff programs deduct a given amount per unit of product marketed by the 
producer to finance market development programs. Such programs exist under 
either special individual commodity legislation or general authorizing legislation, 
such as marketing orders. Such legislation may allow for refunds which reduce 
the programs' effectiveness and equity. 
To finance foreign and domestic market development programs and research. 
Checkoff programs are used when the necessary legislation exists and the 
required majority of the producers approve it in a referendum. In special com-
modity legislation at the federal level, refund provisions have generally been 
required. 
Voluntary checkoff programs have proved difficult to maintain. Mandatory 
checkoff programs with refund provisions have sometimes encountered problems 
with relatively high redemption experience. Congress has generally been unwill-
ing to allow a mandatory program without refund provisions. 
• Without refund provisions, checkoff programs provide an equitable means of 
financing costly market development programs . 
• With refund provisions, checkoff programs offer the potential for having ineq-
uities. 
35 
Policy Tool: 
Policy Area: 
What It Is: 
Objective: 
When Used: 
Experience: 
Consequences: 
36 
Cooperatives, Capper-Volstead 
Marketing Programs, Market Organization and Control 
The Capper-Volstead Act gives producers the right to act together in marketing 
their products, therefore providing cooperatives limited exemption from the anti-
trust laws. It prohibits cooperatives from unduly enhancing price, however. The 
Secretary of Agriculture is responsible for enforcing the provisions regarding 
undue price enhancement. 
To assist producers in jointly marketing their products by providing a means for 
increasing prices, lowering costs, stabilizing market flows, expanding markets, or 
improving communication. 
The Capper-Volstead exemption is limited to farmers and to marketing functions. 
Farmers are those involved in actual growing functions; therefore, agribusiness 
corporate integrators are not farmers. Likewise, joint, otherwise illegal, activities 
between cooperatives and non cooperatives are not covered by the Capper-Vol-
stead exemption. Marketing functions are interpreted broadly to include bar-
gaining, information, pricing, processing, and so forth . Cooperatives appear to 
have virtually unlimited rights to merge with one another. They cannot, how-
ever, engage in predatory or coersive practices with regard to either members or 
nonmembers. 
Cooperatives have effectively organized to market their products in a number of 
ways. The cooperative market share is about 33 percent overall, but as high as 
65 percent of the market in milk, fruits for processing, and vegetables for pro-
cessing. Cooperatives are most effective when they are integrated and there is a 
firm producer commitment to market through them. Marketing orders are fre-
quently used to augment cooperative market power and influence. Proposals 
have been made to eliminate the Capper-Volstead exemption or to transfer it to 
the Federal Trade Commission for enforcement. 
• Suspending provisions of the Capper-Volstead Act would render pricing activi-
ties among farmers a violation of the Sherman Act and the Federal Trade 
Commission Act. 
• Cooperatives have the potential for raising producer returns if well organized, 
well managed, and producers have a commitment to market through the coop-
erative. 
• Cooperatives' influence is frequently eroded by so-called "free riders" who 
obtain the benefits of the cooperative but pay none of the costs. 
• Substantial producer investment is generally required for successful cooperative 
activity. 
• Cooperatives have been important to the functioning of marketing orders 
because cooperative members have been allowed to vote as a bloc. 
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Marketing Orders 
Marketing Programs, Market Organization and Control 
Domestic Farm Policy, Price Stabilization 
Marketing orders are joint industry - government programs regulating the quan-
tity and/or quality of specified products entering the market channel. Marketing 
orders are authorized for specific commodities under the Agricultural Marketing 
Agreements Act of 1937. 
To create more orderly marketing conditions for farm products and thereby sta-
bilize supplies, prices, and producer income. 
Marketing orders are available only for com,modities designated in the Agricul-
tural Marketing Agreements Act. These include specific fruits, vegetables, nuts, 
and milk. Orders for fruits, vegetables, and nuts emphasize the establishment of 
minimum quality, grade, size, or maturity standards for products entering the 
market. Reserve pools exist for some commodities in which stocks are held over 
the marketing season or into the next marketing season. Milk prices are set by 
the marketing order in terms of the milk's end use. Higher prices are charged 
for milk used for fluid purposes. Orders are put into effect after a commodity 
hearing, the concurrence of the Secretary of Agriculture, and the approval of 
two-thirds of the affected producers in a referendum. 
Marketing orders have been highly effective in stabilizing markets where they 
have been used. Over time, however, the Secretary of Agriculture has been less 
inclined to utilize orders as strict supply management tools. Emphasis has thus 
been placed on orderly marketing and price stabilization. Strict marketing quotas 
have been limited to minor commodities such as hops and peppermint. All mar-
keting orders with market flow provisions are under attack by the Office of 
Management and Budget as well as consumer advocate groups. 
• Increased price stability is provided throughout the marketing season by strict 
marketing controls. 
• Commodities available for sale are of more uniform quality. 
• Commodities are more readily available throughout the year. 
• Producer prices are increased. 
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40 
Crop and Livestock Production Reports 
Marketing Programs, Market Facilitators 
Crop and livestock production reports provide detailed estimates (predictions) of 
crop production from before planting (intentions) through harvest. 
To improve the quality and quantity of available information on production 
prospects and thereby make markets more competitive. 
Crop and livestock production reports have their origin in a series of laws 
enacted between World War I and the late 1940s. They are used by the private 
sector as an aid to production and marketing decisions, by economists to forecast, 
and by government officials to develop policy and aid in program decisions. 
The USDA's goal is estimates within 1 or 2 percent of actual production. Its 
record in achieving this degree of accuracy has been outstanding. USDA crop 
reports are frequently charged with having the effect of lowering farm prices. A 
bias one way or the other is impossible to confirm. Extensive steps are taken to 
protect the integrity of the reports. Government cost cutting measures have 
reduced the quantity (and maybe the quality) of available information. Efforts to 
charge for access to crop and production reports have come under considerable 
fire. 
• Crop and livestock reports make markets more competitive. 
• Without crop and livestock reports, this information would be available only to 
those firms that can afford this service from private information sources. This 
would be mainly agribusiness firms and large-scale farmers. 
• Crop and livestock reports increase the accuracy of both public and private 
sector economic outlook and situation analysis. 
• Crop and livestock reports are needed for informed policy decisions. They 
provide the data base on which economic analyses are conducted. 
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Export Sales Reporting 
Marketing Programs, Market Facilitators 
The USDA presently requires that export sales involving more than 100,000 MT 
of major grains and oilseeds be reported to the USDA within 24 hours of sale. 
For other commodities, weekly reports are required. 
The policy is designed to provide information for the government to use in 
developing export policies and programs, to provide producers with information 
to help in their marketing decisions, and to improve performance of U.S. com-
modity markets by making timely information on export sales transactions avail-
able to the public. 
Following the impacts of the unanticipated large grain sales to the USSR in 1972, 
the government instituted the export sales reporting system in September 1973 
under Section 812 of the Agriculture and Consumer Protection Act of 1973. It 
has been in operation since that time. Modifications to the system were made in 
1980 to shorten the public reporting lags of 11 to 18 days to approximately 7 to 
14 days. 
The export sales reporting system has had moderate success in achieving its goal 
of increased access to timely information. The system still suffers from substan-
tial lag time in reporting information and limited detail on contract specifics. A 
number of alternatives, including specific contract terms and prenotification, have 
been considered. 
• Overall quality and quantity of information concerning export transactions is 
increased. 
• USDA is provided with prior warning of sales that could jeopardize supplies 
available in the United States. 
• More information on supplies reduces the probability of an embargo resulting 
from commodity shortages. 
• Prices are more responsive to export market conditions. 
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42 
Grades and Standards 
Marketing Programs, Market Facilitators 
Grades and standards classify units of a commodity according to quality so the 
variation or range in quality is smaller within groups than it is over the whole 
range of the commodity. 
To develop homogenous groups by quality to facilitate orderly marketing of a 
commodity. 
Grain grades are established under the U.S. Grain Standards Act while other 
grades are established under several different pieces of legislation, including the 
Agricultural Marketing Act of 1946. Gra«;les and standards exist for virtually all 
agricultural commodities. Most grades are primarily designed to facilitate trading 
at the wholesale market level although grades such as those on beef have a defi-
nite consumer orientation. 
Once grades are established, they are very difficult to change. In addition, there 
is resistance to the establishment of consumer oriented grades because opportu-
nities for product differentiation (advertising) are reduced. Questions exist 
regarding the extent to which grades should reflect the end use of the product. 
Frequently, private grades and USDA grades reflect a different set of factors. 
Over time, grades and standards tend to become unresponsive to consumer pref-
erences, probably because of resistance to changing the grades. 
• Grades increase the quantity of information available to buyers and sellers. 
• Grades increase the accuracy of pricing within different quality classes of the 
commodity. 
• Grades reduce the opportunity for abuse and misunderstanding between buyers 
and sellers of commodities that are sold without buyer inspection. 
• Grades force the quality marketed to the lowest acceptable level of each grade. 
• Grades reduce the opportunity for product differentiation. 
GENERAL ECONOMIC POLICY TOOLS 
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44 
Monetary Policy 
General Economic Policy 
Monetary policy involves managing the supply and demand for money as a 
means of regulating the general economy. The primary impact of monetary pol-
icy is on the quantity of money available for lending and thus on the rate of 
interest. Managing the money supply is the primary function of the Federal 
Reserve System. 
To maintain stable economic growth and control inflation through the manage-
ment of the money supply. 
Primary reliance on monetary policy to manage the economy has largely been 
associated with Republican administrations. The Reagan administration has 
placed unusually heavy reliance on monetary policy to control inflation. 
Considerable debate exists among economists and policy makers regarding the 
extent to which monetary policy can be effectively utilized to obtain stable eco-
nomic growth without inflation. Reagan economic policies resticting monetary 
growth have resulted in high interest rates and fostered a strong dollar. This 
combination has had adverse effects on exports, housing, automobile industries, 
and real growth. Additionally, this policy has compounded the cost-price squeeze 
and cash flow problems suffered by commercial farmers who are under capital-
ized and/or beginning farmers. 
• Monetary restraint, meaning relatively slow and stable money supply growth, 
results in relatively high interest rates and a strong dollar. 
• High interest rates reduce incentives to invest in plant and equipment while 
encouraging savings and investment in dollars to gain both interest income and 
any appreciation in value relative to other currencies. 
• When the dollar increases in value, U.S. farm products become more expensive 
in terms of foriegn currencies. As a result, exports decline. 
• A decline in exports hurts the U.S. balance of trade, meaning imports increase 
relative to exports. When imports are greater than exports, it is referred to as 
an unfavorable balance of trade. 
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Fiscal Policy 
General Economic Policy 
Fiscal policy involves the federal government using its power to tax and spend as 
a means of stimulating or curbing the overall level of economic activity. The 
primary impact of fiscal policy is on the aggregate demand for goods and servi-
ces. The President and the Congress have direct control over fiscal policy. 
To maintain economic growth and control inflation through tax and spending 
policy. 
Primary reliance on fiscal policy to manage the economy has largely been associ-
ated with Democratic administrations. The Kennedy and Johnson administra-
tions became particularly strong advocates of using the power to tax and spend to 
"fine tune" the economy. 
The impact of fiscal policy on economic growth appears to be more direct and 
has less adverse impact on particular sectors such as agriculture. However, since 
tax increases are always politically unpopular, deficits in government spending 
have had a strong tendency to widen. Questions then arise as to how the deficit 
should be financed. 
• Tax cuts (investment tax credits, accelerated cost recovery, first year expensing 
and lower tax rates) increase disposable income and thus stimulate the econ-
omy. 
• Government spending increases the demand for goods and services and thus 
stimulates the economy. 
• Slowing down economic growth requires an increase in taxes or a reduction in 
government spending. 
• Fiscal restraint is more difficult to implement politically than monetary 
restraint. 
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